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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.
Cross-Defendant/Appellant Tammy Sue Dixson (hereinafter referred to as
"Tammy") 1 and Mark Wallace Dixson (hereinafter referred to as "Mark") were married
on January 1, 2000, and remained husband and wife at the time of Mark's death from
Amytrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), which is commonly known as Lou Gehrig's
disease, on May 5, 2006. During the parties' marriage, and prior to Mark's diagnosis with
Lou Gehrig's disease, Mark applied for and obtained a $300,000 term life insurance
policy (the "Policy") from Banner Life Insurance (hereinafter "Banner Life") and named
Tammy, his spouse, as the beneficiary.
Mark required skilled nursing care due to the debilitating nature of the
disease from December 2004, until his death. Two change of beneficiary designations are
at issue in the case at bar, both of which were dated after Mark entered the nursing home
in 2004. The first Beneficiary Change Form was "signed" by Mark on or about January
31, 2005. This Beneficiary Change Form did not contain Tammy's consent as required by
the Policy. This Beneficiary Change Form was not received by Banner Life.
The Policy premiums for 2005 and 2006 were paid by the Dixson's family
home teacher, Cory Armstrong. Tammy asserts that the payments constituted a loan to
Mark and Tammy. However, the Trust asserts that the premium amounts were paid by
Cory Armstrong and were therefore a gift which caused the policy to become his separate
property.

1

Appellant Tammy Sue Dixson is referred to in the pleadings and the record as "Tammie;" however, Ms.
Dixson's first name is correctly spelled as "Tammy." Thus, Ms. Dixson's name herein is spelled "Tammy,"

rather than "Tammie."

1

Mark, assisted by his mother and step-father, Jackie and Robert Young,
(referred to as "Jackie" or "Robert" or collectively as the "Youngs") filed a pro se
divorce action, naming Tammy Sue Dixson as the defendant on August 18, 2005. The
Honorable David E. Day issued a Joint Temporary Restraining Order (Property), which
specifically prohibited either party (or their agents)2 to the divorce from changing life
insurance policy beneficiaries. Mark obtained a Default in the divorce action but such
default was set aside by Judge Day on April 25, 2006 because Mark did not effect
personal service of the Complaint upon Tammy. A decree of divorce was never entered
and the divorce action was dismissed with prejudice on June 19, 2006.
The second purported Beneficiary Change Form, made on or about April
27, 2006, was orchestrated by Mark's mother, Jackie and his step-father, Robert. The
second Beneficiary Change Form was not signed by Mark, but was signed by Mark's
step-father, Robert, on April 27, 2006 under a power of attorney. Tammy's written
consent to the change of beneficiary, required by the Policy, was not obtained. This
change of beneficiary removed Tammy as the Policy beneficiary and named Mark's
mother, Jackie Young, as the primary beneficiary. The April 27, 2006, Beneficiary
Change Form was made in violation of the terms of the Joint Temporary Restraining
Order issued in the divorce proceeding. Tammy had no knowledge of the 2005 or the

2006, change of beneficiary forms until after Mark's death. Jackie subsequently assigned
the Policy proceeds to the Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust (hereinafter "the
Trust"), which was created by Jackie following Mark's death.
Tammy disputes the validity of both the 2005 and 2006 attempted
2

Emphasis added.
2

beneficiary changes on the grounds that the required spousal consent was not obtained for
either. Tammy further disputes the validity of the 2006 change of beneficiary which
violated the Joint Temporary Restraining Order (Property) issued in the divorce
proceeding, violated the terms of the Policy and was in contrast to Idaho law.
Claims for the Policy proceeds were filed by both Jackie and Tammy
following Mark's death. Banner Life filed an interpleader action, placing the proceeds of
the Policy with the Court for determination of which claimant was entitled to the
proceeds. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by Tammy and the Trust. The
trial court ruled that the change of beneficiary form executed by Robert, via the power of
attorney, in 2006 was valid and granted the Trust's motion for summary judgment. The
trial court denied Tammy's motion for summary judgment. The trial court awarded the
Trust attorney fees and costs. Tammy appeals the trial court's decision.
B. Course ofProceedings Below.

Plaintiff, Banner Life, filed a Complaint for Interpleader on January 23,
2007, naming the Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust and Tammy Sue Dixson as
defendants. (R. Vol. I, PP. 7-45). On February 1, 2007, the Trust filed its Answer to

Complaint for Interpleader and Cross-claim against Tammy, alleging that Tammy's
claim to the Policy proceeds was without merit because the 2005 and 2006 Policy
premiums were made by a third party as a gift to Mark, thereby rendering the Policy
Mark's separate property permitting Mark to remove his spouse as the Policy without his
spouse's consent. (R. Vol. I, PP. 45-50).
On March 2, 2007, Tammy filed her Answer to Complaint for

Interpleader, Answer to Cross-claim and Third-Party Complaint against Robert and
3

Jackie Young. Tammy, in her Answer to Cross-Claim, denied that the Trust was entitled
to the Policy proceeds on the basis that: (a) the Trust was not the real party in interest; (b)
Idaho Code §41-1830 provides that the Policy proceeds are Tammy's separate property;
and (c) that Tammy did not consent to the changes removing her as beneficiary as
required by the Policy. (R. Vol. I, PP. 55-56). Tammy's Third Party Complaint against
the Youngs alleged that the Beneficiary Change Form submitted by Mark on January 31,
2005, was invalid because Tammy had not consented to the change as required by the
Policy. Tammy further alleged, in her Third Party Complaint, that the Beneficiary
Change Form signed by Robert on April 27, 2006, was invalid because: (a) Tammy had
not consented to her removal as Policy beneficiary as required by the Policy; (b) any
change in life insurance beneficiary was prohibited by the Joint Temporary Restraining

Order (Property) issued by Judge Day in the divorce proceeding filed by Mark against
Tammy; ( c) that the Youngs breached their fiduciary duties under the power of attorney
by acting in their own best interest in naming Jackie as the beneficiary of the Policy; and
( d) the change oflife insurance beneficiary without spousal consent by Tammy violated
Idaho law. (R. Vol. I, PP. 56-61).
The Youngs filed a Reply to Third Party Complaint on March 6, 2007,
admitting that Mark and Tammy were married and admitting that Tammy's consent was
not given for the April 27, 2006, Beneficiary Change Form. (R. Vol. I, P. 63, ,r I; P. 64, ,r
3).

On May 16, 2007, Tammy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol.
I, PP. 68 A-C) and a Memorandum in Support of Tammie Sue Dixson 's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Tammie Sue Dixson 's Memorandum in Opposition to the Mark

4

Wallace Dixson 's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 7). Tammy
requested that the Court rule as a matter oflaw that the Beneficiary Change Forms signed
by Mark, or by Robert, via power of attorney, were invalid because they lacked Tammy's
written consent to her removal as beneficiary. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 7, PP.
- - - - ~ · Further, Tammy requested that the Court rule as a matter of law that the
attempt to remove Tammy as beneficiary of the Policy violated Idaho Code §41-1830.
Tammy also asserted that judgment as a matter of law should be entered against the Trust
on the basis that the April 27, 2006, Beneficiary Change Form violated the Joint

Temporary Restraining Order in the divorce action. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, Ex 7, pp 8-10).
Tammy filed the Affidavit of Tammy Sue Dixon in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment contemporaneously with her Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, P.
102A, ex 8). Tammy filed a Reply Memorandum in Opposition to the Mark Wallace
Dixson's Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of Tammie Sue Dixson's Motion
for Summary Judgment on June 8, 2007. (R., Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 16).
The Trust filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 14, 2007,
asserting that the Trust was entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see R. Vol. I, P. 3,
3/14/2007). The Trust also filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Tammy

Sue Dixon in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on May 29, 2007. (R. Vol.
I, P. 68D). On June 13, 2007, Tammy filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of

Robert Young, Jackie E. Young, Kaye Baker, Cory Armstrong, and Canyin Barnes in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. Vol. I, PP. 68G-68V). Each party's
Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to Strike were heard by the trial court on
June 15, 2007. The trial court, the Hon. Thomas A. Neville presiding, ruled from the

5

bench on the parties' respective Motions to Strike (Tr. Vol. I, P. 15, 11. 17-25; PP. 16-28;

P. 29, 11 1-6). An Order Re: Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Robert Young,
Jackie E. Young, Kaye Baker, Cory Armstrong, and Canyin Barnes was entered on
August 14, 2007 (R. Vol. I, P. 68N). An Order Re: Third Party Plaintiff's Motion to

Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Tammie Sue Dixon in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment was issued on August 14, 2007 (R. Vol. I, P. 68S).
The trial court took the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by each
party under advisement. (Tr. Vol. I, P.63, IL 24-25; P. 64, IL 1-13). On November 9,
2007, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting the Trust's Motion

for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, P. 69). An Order, Judgment and Decree was issued on
November 14, 2007. (R. Vol. I, P. 93). On November 19, 2007, the Trust filed a

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (R. Vol. I, P.102B, ex 19). The Affidavit of
Thomas G. Walker and the Affidavit of Mackenzie Whatcott was filed on November 19,
2007, in support of the Trust's request for an award of attorney fees and costs. (R. Vol. I,
P. 102B, ex 20 and 21).
Tammy filed an Objection to Fees and Costs on November 30, 2007. (R.
Vol. I, P. 96A). The Trust's Response to Tammy Sue Dixson 's Objection to Memorandum

of Costs and Attorney Fees was filed on December 4, 2007. (R. Vol. I, P. 96J). Oral
argument was heard on the Trust's request for an award of fees and costs on January 11,
2008. (Tr. Vol. II). The trial court awarded the Trust's fees and costs, and entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with Respect to an Award of Costs and Fees to
the Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust; & Tammie Sue Dixson on January 16, 2008.
(R. Vol. I, P. 101A).

6

Tammy filed a Notice of Appeal on December 21, 2007, appealing in
essence the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the Trust and denial of her crossmotion for summary judgment (R. Vol. I, P. 97-101). grant of attorney fees and costs
against her and for the Trust. (R. Vol. I, P. l 09). An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed
on February 21, 2008.

C. Statement of Facts.

Mark Wallace Dixson and Tammy Sue Dixson were married on January 1,
2000, and remained husband and wife until Mark's death on May 5, 2006, from Lou
Gehrig's disease (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8,

,r

1). On or about April 23, 2003, Mark

completed an application for life insurance with Banner Life Insurance Company (R. Vol.
I, P. 8; PP. 12-40, ex A; P. 102, ex I,

,r

5; P. 102A, ex 8,

,r 3),

and named his wife,

Tammy, as sole beneficiary of the $300,000 life insurance policy under Part I, Section B
of the Policy Application. (R. Vol. I, P. 24; P. 102, ex 1,

,r 6;

P. 102A, ex 8,

,r 4).

On

April 29, 2003, Banner Life issued Policy Number I 7B635069 to Mark, insuring his life
and naming Tammy as the beneficiary upon Mark's death. (R. Vol. I, P. 14; P. 24). The
Beneficiary Change Form, which becomes a part of the Policy, states that spousal consent
is required in the State of Idaho prior to removing the spouse as the beneficiary of the
Policy. (R. Vol. I, P. 41).
On or about September 29, 2003, Mark was diagnosed with Amytrophic
Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), also known as Lou Gehrig's Disease. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 2, ,r
7; P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 5). Following his diagnosis with ALS, Mark's condition deteriorated
to the point that he required skilled nursing care and was admitted to Life Care Center of
Treasure Valley in December, 2004. (R. Vol, I, P. 102A, ex 8,

7

,r 6; P.

102A, ex 2,

,r 9).

Mark continued to reside in the nursing home, requiring 24-hour care until his death on
May 5, 2006, due to respiratory failure caused by ALS. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 6; P.
102A, ex 1, ,i 15; P. 102A, ex 4, ,i 11). Mark's primary care physician, Dr. Louis M.
Schlickman, attested in a sworn statement that in "March of 2006, Mark was in the
advanced stages of [Lou Gehrig's Disease] and was residing in a long term care facility
because he was completely unable to physically care for himself." (R. Vol. I, P. 102, ex
3, ,i 9). Mark was cognitively intact, but "he was significantly hampered due to his
limited ability to communicate." (Id. at ,i 9).
Tammy visited Mark on a daily basis, except when required to travel to
Grand Rapids, Michigan, with her sons to facilitate court-ordered visitation with their
biological father, when her mother was terminally ill and when she was on bed-rest
orders due to her pregnancy in January and February, 2005. In January and February,
2005, she visited Mark a couple of times each week. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 13).
Cory Armstrong, Mark and Tammy's family home teacher from the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, visited Tammy and Mark once per month and sometimes
twice per month from approximately February, 2004 to 2005. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8,
,i,i 10, 11, and 12).

Mark was unable to work from approximately July 22, 2003, until his death due to
the effects of ALS, and, as a result, could not support his family and the marital
community. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 7). Mark and Tammy paid the Banner Life Policy
premiums in 2003 and 2004, but in 2005 and 2006, the financial toll of Mark's terminal
illness required Mark and Tammy to seek financial assistance. Mark and Tammy turned
to Mark's mother and step-father, Jackie and Robert Young for help, but they refused to

8

provide financial assistance to Mark and Tannny. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, if 9). Mark
and Tannny confided in their family home teacher, Cory Armstrong, who offered to pay
the Policy premiums in 2005 and 2006, with the understanding that the payments were a
loan which would be repaid by Tammy upon Mark's death. Tammy told Jackie about
Cory Armstrong's loan for payment of the policy premiums. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8,

,r

10).
On or about January 31, 2005, Mark purportedly executed a beneficiary change
form for the Policy, changing the named beneficiary from his wife, Tammy, to his
mother, Jackie. (R. Vol. I, P. 41, ex A). On the same date, Robert and Jackie caused their
attorney to draft a power of attorney for Mark naming Robert as the attorney-in-fact. (R.
Vol. I, P. 102, ex I,

,r 9;

P. 102A, ex 4,

,r 8).

Mark was not able to sign the power of

attorney in January, 2005. (R. Vol. I, P. 102, ex 3,

,r 5).

The power of attorney was

notarized, but there are dates handwritten on the notary block and there are two separate
dates, approximately one year apart. The notary block recites that Mark appeared before
the notary "[o]n this 31st day of January, 2005" and above that date is a handwritten
notation "and 3rd day February 2006." (R.Vol. I, P. 102, ex 3 ,r ,r 5 and 6). At the bottom
of the notary block, at the bottom of page 6 of the power of attorney, is a signature stamp
which reads "Mark Dixson." (R.Vol. I, P. 102, ex 3, ,r ,r 5 and 6).
The January 31, 2005, Beneficiary Change Form, did not contain Mark's
signature, but rather his initials. (R.Vol. I, P. 41). The written initials on the January 31,
2005, power of attorney, which are purportedly Mark Wallace Dixson's, and the
Beneficiary Change Forrn of the same date are significantly different.
The Beneficiary Change Form dated January 31, 2005, provides, in a line directly

9

below the policy owner's signature line, " _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Additional

Signature **(if necessary). Directly below the "additional signature" line, the Beneficiary
Change Form provides "**[t]he following states require a spousal signature AZ, CA, ID,
LA, NV, NM, TX, WA, WI and Puerto Rico." (R. Vol. I, P. 41) (emphasis supplied).
Mark and Tammy resided in Idaho; however, Mark's spouse, Tammy, did not sign the
Beneficiary Change Form as required by the Beneficiary Change Form. (R. Vol. I, P. 41;

P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 27).
Mark's mother and step-father drafted a prose Complaint for Divorce for Mark
naming Tammy as the defendant. The Complaint for Divorce was filed in Ada County on
or about August 18, 2005. (R. Vol. I, P. 102, ex 1, ,i 11 ). The divorce Complaint was
typed, presumably by Jackie, and "signed" by Mark via a signature stamp for "Mark
Dixson." (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 36, ex F). In August, 2005, Mark could not write or
type due to the advanced state of his ALS. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 36, ex G, ,i 7). On
August 18, 2005, the Hon. David E. Day issued a Joint Temporary Restraining Order

(Property) which provided:
The judges of the domestic relations court of Ada County are of
the opinion that all parties to such proceedings ought to be subject to a
joint restraining order from the date of institution of the proceeding or
service of process in order to maintain the status quo regarding their
property. Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(a) the plaintiff and defendant
are prohibited from doing the following acts during the pendency of this
action without specific written consent of the parties or prior Order of the
Court.

Cashing, borrowing against, canceling, transferring, disposing of,
or changing the beneficiaries of any insurance or indemnity policy,
including without limitation life, ... held for the benefit of the parties ...

10

(R.Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 14, and ex A thereto) (emphasis supplied).
The Joint Temporary Restraining Order also provided:

... this Joint Temporary Restraining Order shall become a
temporary injunction and shall remain in effect as a temporary injunction
until a final order is entered on the Complaint, Petition or Motion, or until
further order of the Court ... This order shall be binding on each party, on
their servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or
participation with those who receive actual notice of this order by personal
service or otherwise.
(Id.)

On January 9, 2006, Judge Day, upon Mark's sworn application, entered a Default
against Tammy, in the pending divorce action. The sworn Testimony ofDefault Applicant
submitted by Mark, in support of his application for the entry of default against Tammy
in the divorce action, stated: "I am totally disabled and unable to move. My only means
of communications is (sic) via alphabet board and eye blinks. My disease, ALS, or Lou
Gerhig's Disease, is terminal and without a cure." (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, and ex G
thereto, at p. 2

,r 7).

Thereafter, on January 27, 2006, Tammy moved to set the default

aside on the basis that she had not been personally served. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,r 39,
and ex H thereto). On April 26, 2006, Judge Day set aside the Default against Tammy.
(R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8,

,r 41

and ex J thereto). The divorce proceeding was pending at

the time of Mark Wallace Dixson's death. The Court entered an Order for Dismissal with
Prejudice in the divorce case on June 19, 2006.

Despite the joint temporary restraining order, Robert, acting under the power of
attorney, completed a Beneficiary Change Form naming his wife, Jackie E. Young as the
primary beneficiary of the Policy on April 27, 2006. (R. Vol. I, P. 41; P. 102A, ex 4,

11

,r

10). The Beneficiary Change Form requires the signature of the policy owner's spouse.
(R. Vol. I, P. 41). The Form also directs, in bold print, that "[t]o process your request
without delay, please make snrethe following have been completed:
_ _ Did the Policy owner(s) sign and date the form?
_ _ Do the percent totals equal 100%
_ _. Did you include the spousal signature if applicable
_ _ Did witness sign and date the form and an additional signature if
applicable?
_ _ Did you enclose the title page and signature page of the trust if listed as a
beneficiary?

(Id.).
Robert Young made the notation "NI A" on the last item, "[ d]id you enclose the
title page and signature page of the trust if listed as a beneficiary?" (R. Vol. I, P. 41).
Tammy did not sign the Beneficiary Change Form, nor was Tammy notified of the
completion or submission of the Beneficiary Change Form. Robert Young did not obtain
or request Tammy's consent as Mark's spouse as required by the Policy. (R.Vol. I, P.
102A, ex 8, ,r,r 20, 28).
On April 27, 2006, the same day the Beneficiary Change Form was executed by
Robert, Mark was transported from the nursing home to St. Luke's Hospital via
ambulance. Mark was on a respirator at that time. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8,

,r 21).

The

April 27, 2006, Beneficiary Change Form was sent to Banner Life on May 2, 2006, by
Mark's divorce attorney, Geoffrey Goss. (R. Vol. I, P. 40;, P.102A, ex 8,

,r 1). Mark died

on May 5, 2006. Jackie made a claim to the Policy proceeds on May 20, 2006. (R.Vol. I,
P. 9). Mark's wife, Tammy, filed a claim form for the Policy proceeds on May 23, 2006.
(R. Vol. I, P. 9).

12

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Whether the District Court erred in not applying Idaho Code §41-1803.

B. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the last premium payment
controlled the characterization of the subject life insurance policy and, subsequently, the
life insurance proceeds.
C. Whether the District Court erred in its legal conclusion that the community's
interest in the policy lapsed when the premiums were paid by a third party for two years.
D. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the payment of the insurance
premiums in 2005 and 2006 was a gift rather than a loan.
E. In the alternative, if a gift was made, whether the District Court erred in
determining the gift was made to Mark Dixson, rather than made to the community.
F. Whether the District Court erred in finding that Mark's attempt to change the
insurance policy beneficiary was not void although it was in direct violation of the Court
ordered Joint Temporary Restraining Order issued in the divorce matter.
G. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the change of beneficiary
without spousal consent or signature did not violate the terms of the insurance policy and
Idaho law.
H. Whether the District Court erred in granting all or some of attorney's fees to
the Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust.

III.

FEES ON APPEAL

Appellant, Tammy Sue Dixson, is respectfully requests an award of attorney fees
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and costs on appeal, as a prevailing party, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Idaho
Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, 12-107.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Whether the District Court erred in not applying Idaho Code §41-1803.
The trial court erred declining to apply Idaho Code §41-1803 in the case at bar.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1803, a life insurance policy insuring the life ofa husband is
the separate property of the wife. The trial court concluded that Idaho Code §41-1803
does not create an exception to community property law and is not dispositive to
Tammy's right to the proceeds. (R.Vol. I, PP. 81-82). The Policy, applied for and
obtained during Mark and Tammy's marriage, was the separate property of Tammy
pursuant to Idaho statute. It is undisputed that the initial beneficiary form completed by
Mark named his wife, Tammy, as the beneficiary. It is also undisputed that Tammy did
not consent to Mark, in essence, giving away her separate property. Thus, any attempt by
Mark, or his agents, to remove Tammy as the beneficiary of the Policy deprived Tammy
of her separate property, and is void and unenforceable.

Even if the policy was

characterized as community property and not Tammy's separate property as set out in the
statute, Tammy wonld have had a community interest in the policy which would preclude
a beneficiary change by Mark unilaterally pre-empting het community property interest.
It is beyond the trial court's purview and authority to re-write Idaho community property
law. It was error for the trial court to circumvent the legislature's intended financial
protection for a spouse as set forth in Idaho Code §41-1803 in order to reach a result not
intended or provided for by Idaho law.
B. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the last premium payment
14

controlled the characterization of the subject life insurance policy and,
subsequently, the life insurance proceeds.
The trial court granted the Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied
Tammy's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that "(t]he life insurance policy
and the relevant premiums paid as a gift by Cory Armstrong to Mark Wallace Dixson
became Mark's separate property ... However, as is more fully set forth below, the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the Trust ignored material and genuine issues of
fact which preclude deciding the matter as an issue oflaw." (R. Vol. I, P. 90, II. 22-25; P.
91, II. 1-10). The trial court erred in determining that the last premium paid defined the
characterization of the Policy and the proceeds for the reasons set forth below.
J. The trial court's order granting summary judgment is subject to review
applying the same standard as used by the trial court in ruling on the motion
for summary judgment below.

The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is
the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P .3d 263, 267 (2000); Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790,793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). Summary

judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure only where
"the record reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho
8017, 810, 979 P.2d 1165 (ldaho 1999). The "record must be liberally construed in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and
conclusions supported by the record in favor of that party." Student Loan Fund of Idaho,
Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 49,951 P.2d 1272, 1276 (Idaho 1997). The "burden of
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proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with the moving party."
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994); Curtis v. Firth, 123

Idaho 598, 610, 850 P.2d 749, 761 (1993). The trial court, in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, is not to weigh the evidence or resolve controverted factual issues.
Moss v. Mid-America Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 298, 647 P.2d 754

( 1982). Such factual disputes can only be resolved by a trier of fact after hearing the
testimony at trial. Id. Evidence presented in support of a motion for summary judgment
must be admissible in order to be considered by the Court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 785, 839
P.2d 1192, 1199 (1992). A party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials," but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The fact that both parties in this case moved for summary judgment does not in
and of itself establish that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Each motion must be
reviewed on its own merits. See e.g., Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 459, 551, 716
P.2d 1321 (1986); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 118, 1119
(2000), (citing Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 721, 974 P.2d
528, 532 (1994). Neither party in the instant case requested a jury trial, allowing the trial
court to arrive at the "most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence
properly before it." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d
685, 691 (2004), citing Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191,293 P.2d 434, 436 (1996);
Loomis v. Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

This Court, in reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, must
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"construe the record in the light favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party." Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, _ ,
133 P.3d 1211 (2006).

2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment as genuine issues of
material fact exist with regard to the characterization of the 2005 and 2006
premium payments, as a gift rather than a traditional loan.
The trial court recognized that the issue ofcharacterization of Cory Armstrrong's
payment ofthe 2005 and 2006 premiums involved factual issues. The trial court prefaced
oral argument at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment with the following
comments:
"I also have to tell you that I don't know ifI have to. I don't know
if I should. I'm probably just going to tell you that issues about loans
versus gifts and if a gift, to whom, that that's can be the stuff of nuances
and that's laden with fact.
And as counsel well know, in order to grant a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56, it must find both that there's no genuine issue of
material fact and that one side is the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter oflaw.
... And so I'm concerned about that this may just be the stuff where
a hearing or a trial, Court trial or jury trial, is appropriate ... "
(Tr. Vol. I, P. 30, 111-11; 17-19).

The trial court failed to recognize genuine issues of material fact relative to the
characterization of the funds used to pay the 2005 and 2006 Policy premiums. However,
in its Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court concluded that the 2005 and 2006
Policy premiums paid by Cory Armstrong, Mark and Tammy's family home teacher,
constituted "gifts" solely to Mark, thereby rendering the Policy Mark's separate property
to do with as he pleased. (R. Vol. I; P. 81). Tammy attests in her Affidavit that the 2005
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and 2006 Policy premiums were loaned to Mark and Tammy and paid to Banner Life by
Mark and Tammy's family home teacher following conversations between Mark, Tammy
and Cory Armstrong. (R., Vol. I, P. 102A, ex8,

1 8, 10). Tammy further asserts that the

Policy premiums paid by family home teacher, Cory Armstrong, were paid on behalf of
and for the benefit of the marital community, rather than for Mark solely. (Id.).
There is no dispute that Cory Armstrong, acting as the Dixson's family home
teacher, paid the 2005 and 2006 Policy premiums due to the dire financial straits Mark's
illness had placed his family in. However, there is a significant and material factual issue
as to how those payments are characterized, and what effect that characterization has on
Mark's ability to remove his wife as beneficiary without the required consent and in
violation of a court order. Tammy asserts that the Policy premiums were made by Cory
Armstrong as a loan to Mark and Tammy. Certainly, Tammy, having been present at the
meetings with Cory Armstrong and Mark would have personal knowledge of whether
repayment was intended. The trial court dismissed Tammy's statements as self-serving
and therefore ofno consequence. (R. Vol. I, P. 801 II, 11.14-15). The trial court relies on
Cory Armstrong's "understanding" that Mark wanted the Policy proceeds to care for his
children and gives weight to Cory Armstrong's "understanding" that Tammy refused to
make the premium payments. (R. Vol. I, P. 80, I 11, 11 14-15). The trial court dismissed
Tammy's "understanding" that the premium payments made by Cory Armstrong were a
loan to be repaid, but put great weight on Cory Armstrong's "understanding" that Tammy
refused to pay the premiums and his "understanding" as to Mark's intent. The trial court
emphatically stated that Tammy's statements were self-serving, but did not recognize or
acknowledge that Cory Armstrong's statements were procured by the Youngs to serve the
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Young's purposes. Cory Armstrong, whose affidavit was secured by the Trust's attorney,
has a different version of the arrangement. Mr. Armstrong believed that the payments
were gifts to Mark.
The trial court failed to recognize the significant and material issues of fact. The
trial court failed to construe the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and weighed the evidence, all contrary to Rule 56. The trial court grounded its decision
to grant summary judgment to the Trust in its erroneous finding that the payment of the
premiums was a gift to Mark, rather than a loan to Tammy and Mark. Specifically,
Tammy asserts the payments were loans, and the Youngs and Mr. Armstrong assert they
were "gifts."
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all reasonable
inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party. Thus, it can be reasonably
inferred that Tammy's recollection of her conversation with Cory and Mark supports a
conclusion that the funds advanced to pay the Policy premiums were not gifts, but rather
a loan to be re-paid in the future. Tammy and Mark had asked the Youngs for financial
assistance, but had been rebuffed. (R., Vol. I, P. 102A, ex8, ,i 9). There is no evidence in
the record that Tammy and Mark were looking for a financial handout or a gift from Cory
Armstrong or their church. The characterization of the payments is material to the case
and because that characterization is disputed, summary judgment on that basis is
erroneous. In construing the facts in favor of the non-moving party, the court is required
to infer that the payments were loans before moving forward with its analysis.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the premiums paid by Cory Armstrong,
were gifts, the payments were not gifts made solely to Mark, but were made to Mark and
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Tammy's marital community. All doubts are to be resolved against the Trust, as the
moving party, and the motion must be denied since reasonable people might reach
different conclusions. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Ashby v.
Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 P.2d 402 (1979). The facts are to be liberally construed in

favor of the nonmoving party. Harris v. State Dept. of Health, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847
P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). The onus of proving the absence ofa material fact rests upon the
moving party. The burden "is onerous because even 'circumstantial' evidence can create
a material fact." Id. at 298, citations omitted.
The trial court improperly weighed the evidence presented and failed· to recognize
that two of the parties to the transaction, Tammy and Cory, have differing understandings
of the basis upon which the premiums were paid. The third party to the conversations,
Mark Dixson, is deceased. Further, Cory Armstrong's statements of "understandings"
that "Tammie had refused to pay the premium" and that "Tammie was not visiting him or
taking care of his expenses" colored the trial court's conclusion that the payments were a
gift. Robert and Jackie Young provide sworn statements that the payment(s) by Cory
were gifts solely to Mark, despite the lack of any evidence that the Youngs were
personally present and involved in any conversations between Tammy, Mark and Cory.
The Youngs testimony is inadmissible hearsay which is not reliable for the purposes of
deciding a motion for summary judgment.
C. The District Court erred in determining that the gift was made to Mark Dixson,
rather than the marital community.

In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court stated "[t]o the contrary,
there is strong evidence which demonstrates Cory Armstrong's intent to gift to Mark

20

alone as his separate property based on Armstrong's understanding that Tammie refused
to pay the premium." (R., Vol. I, PP. 78-8 I). The trial court summarily dismissed
Tammy's statements as "self-serving," and therefore ofno merit. (R., Vol. I, P. 81, I. 1).
The trial court violated the summary judgment principle that it is not the trial court's role
to weigh the evidence in inferring that the premium payments made by Cory Armstrong
were a gift to Mark as his separate property.
Further, consider action of the application of this ruling to other divorce type
situations. Should the legislature intend to allow one party by accepting a "gift" of a
premium from another to divest the community of all interest in a previously community
policy, certainly they would specifically state that.

Similarly, in any case where the

parties are making payments towards an asset, by simply having another party "gift" the
payment, does that, under this analysis, completely divest the community of any interest?
If so, this will be a boon to divorcing spouses who want nothing more than to harm the
other. Further, if a parent is dying, having a life insurance policy whose premiums were
paid out of community funds with his current wife, his child from a prior marriage could
make the last few payments to "help dad out" and fully divest the surviving spouse of any
interest in the policy proceeds. The application of this rule is directly contrary to the
spirit of community property law and directly contrary to the letter of Idaho Code § 411803.

D. Whether the District Court erred in finding that Mark's attempt to change the
insurance policy beneficiary was not void although it was in direct violation of
the Court ordered Joint Temporary Restraining Order iss1,1ed in the divorce
matter.
The trial court ruled that the Joint Temporary Restraining Order (Property) issued in
the divorce action filed by Mark Dixson was not applicable and did not prohibit Mark
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from changing the beneficiary of the Policy. The trial court ruled that based upon its
conclusion that the Policy was Mark's separate property, Mark was not bound by the
prohibitions of the divorce court's restraining order. The trial court's conclusion is in
error and is contrary to the purpose of the restraining orders issued in divorce proceedings
which is to preserve the property, both separate and community, of the parties pending a
final disposition of the divorce.
The Hon. David E. Day, Magistrate Ada County, issued a Joint Temporary
Restraining Order (Property) on August 18, 2005, contemporaneously with Mark's
filing a Complaint for Divorce. This Joint Temporary Restraining Order (Property)
prohibited either party, Tammie Sue Dixson or Mark Wallace Dixson, from changing the
beneficiary of any life insurance policy. (R., Vol.LP. 102A, ex 8; R., Vol. 1, P. 102A, ex
14, and ex A thereto).
The Joint Temporary Restraining Order (Property) provides, in pertinent part as
follows:
The judges of the domestic relations court of Ada County are of
the opinion that all parties to such proceedings ought to be subject to a
joint restraining order from the date of institution of the proceeding or
service of process in order to maintain the status quo regarding their
property. Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(a) the plaintiff and
defendant are prohibited from doing the following acts during the
pendency of this action without specific written consent of the parties
or prior Order of the Court:

Cashing, borrowing against, canceling, transferring, disposing of,
or changing the beneficiaries of any insurance or indemnity policy,
including without limitation life, ... held for the benefit of the parties ...
(Id.).
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Finally, the Order provides:
... this Joint Temporary Restraining Order shall become a
temporary injunction and shall remain in effect as a temporary injunction
until a final order is entered on the Complaint, Petition or Motion, or until
further order of the Court ... This order shall be binding on each party, on
their servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or
participation with those who receive actual notice of this order by personal
service or otherwise.
Id.

There is no dispute that the Joint Temporary Restraining Order was in place at
the time Mark, through his agent Robert Young, attempted to change the beneficiary of
the Policy on April 27, 2006. Likewise, there is no dispute that Tammy did not consent to
the change of beneficiary, nor is there is any dispute that the Magistrate Court did not
enter an order in the divorce proceeding allowing the change of beneficiary. The Joint
Temporary Restraining Order (Property), was in full force and effect from the date of the

filing of the Divorce Complaint on August 18, 2005, until the date of the dismissal of the
divorce action on June 19, 2006. The Order, by its terms, applied to Mark, as the plaintiff
in the divorce action, and Robert Young, as Mark's attorney-in-fact, and neither could
claim that he was unaware of the injunction created by the restraining order.
The stated purpose of the Joint Temporary Restraining Order is to ensure that
each party to the divorce action maintained the status quo of their property. The Order
does not differentiate between the spouse's separate or community property as such
determinations are typically at issue in a divorce proceeding. The broad terms of the
restraining order is intended to preserve a snapshot of the parties' assets pending the
disposition of the divorce case.
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The Order issued in the Dixson v. Dixon divorce specifically enjoins either party
from changing the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. Many jurisdictions have
considered the effect of similar restraining orders issued in divorce cases. Some
jurisdictions have upheld the change of beneficiary made during the pendency of a
divorce proceeding where the restraining order does not specifically reference life
insurance policies. See Nicholas v. Nicholas, 83 P.3d 214, 277 Kan. 171 (Kan.
01/30/02004). In cases where a restraining order issued in a divorce proceeding

specifically enjoins the parties from transferring life insurance, courts have enforced
violations of such restraining orders through contempt proceedings. The trial court
suggested that Tammy's remedy would have been a contempt proceeding. However, by
the time Tammy learned that the Joint Temporary Restraining Order (Property) terms
had been violated by Mark, Mark was deceased. Where the violator is deceased, a
remedy at law is not available and an equitable remedy is appropriate. See e.g. Standard
.Insurance Company v. Schwalbe, 110 Wash.2d 520, 755 P.2d 802 (Wash. 1988).

Specifically, the court in Standard noted that "[a]t the time this action was brought, Mr.
Schwalbe was deceased thus precluding a remedy at law in the form of a contempt
proceeding. Recognizing that no remedy at law was available, the trial court can resort to
its equity powers." Id at 526, citing Orwick v. Seattle, 103 Wash 2d 249,252, 692 P.2d
793(1984). The Standard court upheld the trial court's decision and directed the policy

proceeds to be paid to Mrs. Schwalbe. As in the Standard case, the Court here "loses
sight of the real issue: Whether a trial court has the power to order a return to the status
quo to remedy the deliberate violation of a court order." Standard Insurance Company v.
Schwalbe, 110 Wash.2d 520, 526 755 P.2d 802 (Wash. 1988). The correct approach is to
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utilize the equitable powers of the Court when no remedy at law is available. See
Willoughby v. Willoughby, 758 F. Supp. 646 (D. Kan. 01/26/1990).

Courts have held that transfers of property in violation of restraining orders in
divorce actions are invalid and may be set aside. "Transfers of property in violation of an
injunction are invalid and may be set aside by the party to a divorce suit, and subsequent
death of the injunction violator does not prevent the court from exercising such power."
Webb v. Webb, 375 Mich. 624, 134 N. W2d 673 (1965). The death of a party does not

deprive a court of the right to return the property to the status quo. This approach is
particularly applicable here, where · Mark filed for divorce and obtained the Joint
Temporary Restraining Order (Property) at the time of filing. Mark's mother, Jackie, and

step-father, Robert, assisted Mark in preparing and filing his divorce Complaint and were
well aware of the terms of the restraining order. Allowing the change of beneficiary to
stand where the change was a blatant and intentional disregard of the Magistrate Court's
Order, which nullifies the Order and its intent to maintain the status quo of property

during divorce proceedings. If it were the intent of the courts or the legislature to make
such a determination as to the ability to change a beneficiary designation in a divorce
context, the standard form of the Joint Temporary Restraining Order would be changed.
Even if such were the case and there was not a specific prohibition contained in the
Order, the issue becomes one of equity as discussed above. The Court erred in failing to
enforce the terms of the Joint Temporary Restraining Order as it applied to the change in
the beneficiary designation for the life insurance policy.
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E. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the change of beneficiary
without spousal consent or signature did not violate the terms of the insurance
policy and Idaho law.

The Tmst asserts in its Motion for Summary Judgment and arguments in
opposition to Tammy's Motion for Summary Judgment, that Mark was able to change the
beneficiary of the Policy without Tammy's consent because the Policy was Mark's
separate property. The Tmst, in affidavits filed in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment, asserts that Mark communicated his "desire" to remove his wife, Tammy, as
beneficiary of the Policy and name his mother, Jackie, as the beneficiary. Mark's ability
to communicate his desire to change the beneficiary is a material fact central to the
conclusion in this case. The issue is not whether Mark had "mental capacity" to direct the
April 24, 2006 change in beneficiary, but rather was Mark able to even communicate
such a desire.
The trial court's analysis and conclusion that there is no evidence that Mark was
"mentally incapacitated" is misplaced (R. Vol. I, PP. 13-20). The Tmst and the Youngs
repeatedly assert that Mark "communicated" his desire to remove Tammy as his
beneficiary on the Policy. The Tmst and the Youngs concede in the Affidavits filed by
Jackie, Dr. Louis Schlickman, and Robert, that Mark's communication was significantly
hampered. In fact, on April 26, 2006, the day Mark allegedly "communicated" his desire
to change the Policy beneficiary from his spouse to his mother, he was transported by
ambulance to the hospital and was on a ventilator (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, if21). Tammy
asserts that Mark was unable to communicate his desires, especially by April of 2006. As
Mark's spouse, and given her frequent visits with Mark in the nursing home, Tammy
would have personal knowledge of this fact. In April, 2006, Mark was "unable to use the

26

eye board for communication and had a very difficult time blinking due to the
progression of his ALS." (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 14). Tammy attests that on April 26,
2006, Mark was taken by ambulance from the nursing home to St. Luke's hospital and
was on a respirator at that time. (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ,i 21). Mark's physician, Dr.
Louis Schlickman, confirmed, in his affidavit, that Mark "was significantly hampered due
to his limited ability to communicate" as a result of the advanced stage of his ALS. (R.
Vol. I, P. I 02A, ex 2, ,i 9). In January, 2006, Mark himself stated, under oath, in his

Application for Default in the divorce action: "I am totally disabled and unable to
move ... [m]y only means of communications is via alphabet board and eye blinks ... "
Robert Young stated, in his sworn statement, that "[ d]ue to the progression of the disease,
Mark's motor skills were hampered, as well as his ability to verbally communicate ... "
(R., Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 4, ii 7).
The record is replete with evidence that Mark was unable to verbally
communicate, was significantly hampered due to limited communication and limited
physical ability, and unable to use an eye board by April, 2006. Robert and Jackie's
version o(Mark's ability to designate a beneficiary are questionable and self-serving.
Robert and Jackie assert that they visited Mark in the hospital on or about April 26, 2006,
when he was taken from the nursing home via ambulance, and that on that date, Mark
"directed" Robert to change the beneficiary of the Banner Life Policy to name Jackie as
the beneficiary.

(R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 4, ,i 10; P. 102A, ex 1, ,i 14). The record

demonstrates that there is a genuine dispute about Mark's ability to communicate a
directive on April 26, 2006, to Robert to remove Mark's wife, Tammy, as the beneficiary,
and substitute Mark's mother, Jackie, as the beneficiary. It is Tammy's position that
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Mark could not communicate a desire to change the beneficiary of the policy from his
spouse to his mother, Jackie Young, either verbally or non-verbally in April, 2006.
The trial court attempts to avoid the gravity of Mark's inability to communicate in
2006, by simply concluding that "because the Court has determined that the life insurance
policy became the separate property of Mark, the Joint Temporary Restraining Order
would not prevent him from making a change of beneficiary ... " (R. Vol. I, P.90. 11. 4-7).
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Policy was Mark's separate property,
Mark could not direct a change if he was unable to communicate. The Trust asserts that
Mark "directed" the change on April 26, 2006 (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 4,

,r 10), but the

record contains · conflicting evidence which places into question Mark's ability to
communicate and "direct" any action on April 26, 2006, in the final days of his life.
The trial court failed to construe the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to Tammy, as the non-moving party. The trial court glossed over the multitude
of conflicting material facts which appear in the record. The trial court adopted a version
of the facts which favors the moving party's theory of the case, and incorrectly applied
community property law to the facts, despite the requirement of Rule 56 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure that the facts and inferences be construed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. The evidence submitted in opposition to the Trust's
motion for summary judgment was more than colorable and sufficient to withstand
summary judgment. The trial court's function, in evaluating motions for summary
judgment, is not to Weigh the evidence, but determine if there are genuine issues for trial.
G &M Farms v. Funklrr. Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991).
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Trust was error given
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the genuine issues of material fact which exist with regard to the change ofbeneficiaty of
the Policy.

F. The Beneficiary Change Form, as part of the PolicJJ, prohibits the removal of a
spouse as beneficiary without the spouse's consent.

Further, the Beneficiary Change Form, which becomes a part of the Banner Life
Policy, states that spousal consent is required in the State ofldaho prior to removing the
spouse as the beneficiary of the Policy. (R. Vol. I, P. 41). Specifically, an insurance
policy includes the policy as issued, as well as any subsequent amendments, revisions,
and beneficiary change fom1s. "Where the Policy, as a matter of contract, specifies the
method of changing beneficiaries ... a change in beneficiary can be accomplished only in
the manner pointed out in the policy ... " Noyes v. Noyes, 106 Idaho 352, 354-355, 679
P.2d 152, 154-155 (1984). Thus, Mark was required to comply with Banner Life's terms
in order to make an effective beneficiary designation change and that did not occur. It is
undisputed that Tammy did not give her consent to either of Mark Wallace Dixson's
purported change of beneficiary forms removing her as the beneficiary of the Policy. The
Youngs fully acknowledge that Tammy's consent was not sought.
The trial court acknowledges that, absent statutory regulation, an msurance
company can prescribe the method by which the beneficiary of an insurance policy may
be changed. (R. Vol. I, P. 88). The trial court ignores the Beneficiary Change Form's
requirement for spousal consent, which is not hidden on the Beneficiary Change Form,
but appears directly below the owner's signature line. The Policy's requirement for
spousal consent in the State of Idaho is in bold directly below the line provided for
spousal consent. The April 24, 2006, Beneficiary Change Form is not signed by Tammy.
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The trial court's position is that Robert Young had the authority to make the beneficiary
change through use of the power of attorney. However, regardless of whether Robert
Young, as Mark's attorney-in-fact had the authority to sign the Beneficiary Change Form,
the Policy terms require spousal consent and control the method by which a beneficiary
change is made.
The trial court, in reaching its conclusion that Tammy's consent was not required,
has rewritten the insurance contract in order to reach its desired result. The trial court's
failure to recognize and apply the terms of the insurance Policy is reversible error.
G. Tlte trial court erred in granting fees and costs to tlte Trust

The trial court awarded the Trust fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(3) and Idaho Code§ 15-8-208. The award of fees was in error and properly reversed
on appeal.

1., Ida/to Code §12-120(3) Is Reserved For Awarding Attorneys Fees And
Costs In Only Very Specific Enumerated Situations, None Of Wlticlt Are Present Here.
LC. §12-120(3) states:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account
stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction
unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall
be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term II commercial transaction" is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization,
the state ofldaho or political subdivision thereof.
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The basis of this civil action is clearly not a commercial transaction. No party
1s seeking to recover on an "open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services." This is a dispute about the proceeds of an insurance policy of
the decedent.

As the facts alleged in this action are not consistent with any of the

enumerated causes of action set forth in LC. §12-120(3), any claim for an award of
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this statute must be denied.
2. It Would Be Inequitable For The Court To Order Ms. Dixson To Pay The
Trust's Attorney Fees Pursuant To Idaho Code §15-8-208 Under The Circumstances
Of This Case.

Idaho Code § 15-8-208 sets forth:
15-8-208. COST-- ATTORNEY'S FEES. (1) Either the
district court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion,
order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party:
(a) From any party to the proceedings;
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the
proceedings; or
(c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the
proceedings. The court may order the costs to be paid
in such amount and in such manner as the court
determines to be equitable.
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this
chapter including, but not limited to, proceedings involving
trusts, decedent's estates and properties, and guardianship
matters. Except as provided in section 12-117, Idaho Code,
this section shall not be construed as being limited by any
other specific statutory provision providing for the payment
of costs, unless such statute specifically provides otherwise.
The statute specifically states that costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee
may be awarded within the Court's discretion. This is not a situation in which such
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attorney's fees are mandatory unless the Court finds that such an award is particularly
appropriate and equitable under the circumstances. LC. § 15-8-208 further elaborates that
attorney's fees may be awarded to any ])arty, regardless of whether they are considered
the "prevailing" party. His clear that this statute was established to provide the Court
with wide discretion to do what would be fair and equitable under the circumstances of
any given case.

Tammy was interplead in this action initially. She did not initiate this action.
Moreover, the facts and law involved in this action were not clear-cut. In fact, due to the
difficulty of the situation, the insurance company did not even know who the proper
beneficiary of the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance was. Even if Tammy did not
file a cross-claim against Robert and Jackie Young, the Trust would have had to pay
attorney's fees simply by virtue of the interpleader action. It can be undisputed that this
action was necessary in order to determine the questions of fact and law. Under such
circumstances as presented herein, it would be inequitable for Ms. Dixson to be required
to pay the Trust's attorney's fees.

Even if the Court agrees that the Trust should be awarded its attorney fees, the
Court has the ability to order such a payment from any party to the action including the
"nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceedings" or even the "assets of the trust or
estate involved in the proceedings." Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, if
the Court believes the Trust's attorney's fees should be paid in this action, equity dictates
that said attorney's fees be paid either out of the insurance proceeds or the decedent's
estate.
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V.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the Trust for the
reasons set forth herein. The District Courts disregard ofldaho Code 41-1803, the terms
of the Policy requiring spousal consent for the change of beneficiary, and the Joint
Temporary Restraining Order (Property) issued by the Magistrate Court in the divorce
action initiated by Mark Dixson each constitute reversible error. Further, the District
Court granted Summary Judgment despite genuine issues of material fact presented with
regard to the characterization of the property nature of the Policy and the effect on
disposition of the Policy proceeds.

CONCLUSIONS
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of
Summary Judgment in favor of the Trust for the reasons set forth herein. Further,
Appellant respectfully requests that the District Court award of attorney fees and costs to
the Trust under LC. § 15-8-208 and be reversed. Appellant respectfully requests an
award of attorney fees on appeal as set forth herein.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: This 3rd day of July, 2008.
FINCH & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICE, P.A.
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Michelle R. Finch
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: This 3rd day of July, 2008.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY &
DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C.
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Robert W. Talboy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of July, 2008, two true and correct copies of the
within and foregoing document were served via hand delivery on the following:
Thomas G. Walker
Mackenzie Whatcott
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP
800 Park Blvd., Ste. 790
P.O. Box 9518
Boise, Idaho 83707
Idaho Supreme Court
Clerk of the Courts
451 West State Street
Boise ID 83702

Robert W. Talboy
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